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Earnings Management Behaviors under Different Monitoring Mechanisms:  
The Case of Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the impact of organizational religiosity on the earnings quality of listed 
banks in the Middle East and North Africa region. We analyze Islamic banking 
institutions, which operate within strict religious norms and extended accountability 
constraints, and compare them with their conventional counterparts during 2008–2013. 
We find that Islamic banks are less likely to manage earnings and that they adopt more 
conservative accounting policies. Based on these findings, we argue that religious 
norms and moral accountability constraints in these organizations have a significant 
impact on financial reporting quality and agency costs, which has implications for both 
regulators and market participants.  
 
Keywords: Financial reporting quality, earnings management, conservatism, Islamic 
banks, MENA countries, agency costs. 
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1. Introduction 
A well-established branch of the literature indicates that religion has an important role 
in shaping the economic behavior of both individuals and organizations (Barro and 
McCleary, 2003; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Lehrer, 2004; Vitell, 2009; Abdelsalam and 
El-Komi, 2014; Leventis et al., 2016). Within the realm of accounting, for instance, 
religiosity appears to operate as an institutionalized control mechanism that influences 
managerial decisions on corporate financial reporting (Callen and Fang, 2013). While the 
impact of religious social norms on economic behavior has been discussed in advanced 
financial contexts, such as in the United States (Callen and Fang, 2013), this issue has 
received little attention in emerging economies with prevailing Islamic religious norms. 
An ideal setting for such an investigation is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region. 
A distinguishing institutional characteristic of the MENA region is the strong influence 
that religion has on the banking sector. This region has the highest concentration of Islamic 
banks in the world (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2012; Thomson Reuters, 2015).1 
These banks are founded on strict religious principles, which shape their rules and codes 
of practice.2 The Islamic finance industry is approaching $2.5 trillion in worth, and its 
value is growing at a phenomenal rate (Ernst and Young, 2015).  
The developmental role of banks assumes transparent and credible financial reporting. 
Therefore, questions about the quality of financial information undermine the contribution 
of banks to the proper functioning of the financial markets (Barro and McCleary, 2003; 
Callen and Fang, 2013). In the current study, we investigate whether organizational 
religiosity significantly affects the quality of financial reporting. The importance of this 
investigation extends beyond our sample and responds to prior calls for further research 
on the role of social norms and culture (i.e., values extracted from religious scriptures) on 
core economic matters (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
                                                            
1 The regions’ Islamic banks represent 50% (US$2,766,510) of the total assets of Islamic banks ($5,533,020) in the 
22 countries that have a dual banking system (conventional and Islamic banks). This is based on 10 years’ (2003–
2012) data accessed through the Bureau VAN DIJK Bankscope database. 
2 We refer to Islamic banks throughout our discussions as those banks that follow Shariah (Islamic jurisprudence) in 
their business transactions.  
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Islamic banks are based on a constrained3 model of finance that prohibits Riba (usury), 
Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and Maysir (speculations) and encourages the sharing of 
profits, losses, and risks. The constraints of the Islamic banking model imply the existence 
of two directions for agency costs. On the one hand, depositors in Islamic banks are 
contracted as investment account holders (IAHs). In practice, however, Islamic banks’ 
managers have full control over the investment of depositors’ funds; IAHs lack board 
representation and cannot directly monitor bank performance. The absence of IAHs’ 
representation on the board of directors is an additional agency cost borne by the 
depositors. On the other hand, the religious adherence of Islamic banks implies a possible 
reduction in agency costs through organizational moral accountability constraints. 
Previous literature argues that the opportunistic behavior of corporate actors (i.e., 
managers) may be suppressed within an environment that incorporates organizational 
moral values (Kaptein, 2011; Ha-Brookshire, 2015). Islamic banks are also subject to an 
extra layer of governance represented by the Shariah supervisory board4 (SSB). The SSB 
approves and reports on Islamic banks’ compliance with moral values. Moreover, the 
concept of Islamic accountability extends the moral responsibility of the managers and 
board members of Islamic banks beyond conventional legal liability (Beekun and Badawi, 
2005; Belal et al., 2015).  
Against this background, we examine the impact of organizational religiosity on the 
quality of financial reporting by banks in the MENA region. We use accounting 
conservatism5 and earnings management (manipulation)6 as measures of accounting 
quality. Our sample comprises 600 observations of listed banks in the MENA region 
during 2008–2013. Our empirical results show that Islamic banks are more conservative 
and less prone to earnings management. Our results also reveal that these banks are 
                                                            
3 In addition, these banks are not permitted to invest in businesses with core products or activities that are impermissible 
in Islam, such as alcohol, pork, weapons of mass destruction, gambling, adult entertainment products, and cloning. 
4The SSB contains scholars holding specialist religious knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence. The SSB’s main duties 
include: (i) introducing the Shariah guidance for conducting banking business, (ii) issuing a statement in the annual 
report on whether the bank has been conducting its business in compliance with Shariah, and (iii) highlighting any 
breaches of Shariah rules. 
5 Accounting conservatism specifies a higher threshold for recognizing gains and a lower one for recognizing losses, 
with the aim of reporting strict profits and net assets (Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009). 
6 Earnings management indicates the use of subjective judgment by management in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions in ways that alter financial reports either to mislead (conceal) the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers 
(Healy et al., 1999). 
5 
 
 
 
more likely to employ the four largest international audit firms (the Big Four) to 
conduct audits compared with their conventional counterparts, which signals higher 
quality of audits. We conclude that Islamic banks operate within a governance 
framework that enhances financial reporting quality.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we demonstrate the importance 
of organizational religiosity on managerial decision-making in less-developed capital 
markets in which institutional monitoring and enforcement devices are generally 
relatively weak. Secondly, our findings that religious norms operate as a significant 
monitoring mechanism extend what is known on how social norms can affect core 
economic matters, with particular implications for global regulations (e.g., auditing, 
enforcement of financial reporting). Finally, our study furthers the current debate on 
the role of religion with regard to accountability, transparency, and business ethics.  
Our findings highlight important implications for investors and auditors in the global 
banking industry. Investors should be aware that additional institutional factors (i.e., 
organizational religiosity) are associated with enhanced financial reporting quality and 
reduced agency costs. Auditors may regard the operation of religiosity as a monitoring 
mechanism and adjust the depth and the width of their audit procedures accordingly 
(Leventis et al., 2016). Finally, regulators should account for the relationship between 
religiosity and financial reporting quality when attempting to regulate the global 
banking industry (see Guiso et al., 2006). Based on the results of the current study, 
managers of conventional banks operating in the MENA region need to increase the 
quality of their financial reporting. This goal can be achieved with additional and/or 
stronger corporate governance mechanisms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
theoretical background and develops testable hypotheses. The third section presents the 
data selection and methodology used. The fourth section demonstrates the empirical 
findings and sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes the paper.  
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development  
Islamic banks are substantially different from conventional banks in terms of finance 
models, investment modes, and contracts (see Table 1). These differences significantly 
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affect their corporate governance structures, agency conflicts, and overall 
accountability. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Irrespective of the bank type (conventional or Islamic), agency conflicts represent 
an ultimate cost that can influence financial reporting quality within the banking 
industry. An underlying reason for this circumstance is generally related to the complex 
agent–principal (manager–shareholder) relationship and to the unique governance 
structure in banks (Leventis et al., 2013). Thus, agency costs are expected to be more 
pronounced in banks because of a high level of opacity in contractual and reporting 
practices (i.e., the unobserved quality of loan portfolios) (Mülbert, 2009), excessive 
risk-taking behavior given the highly leveraged cost structures (Mehran et al., 2011), 
and greater information asymmetries between insiders (managers) and outsiders 
(stakeholders) (Morgan, 2002). These interrelated qualities make bank performance 
difficult to monitor (Levine, 2004; Leventis et al., 2013). Furthermore, government 
bailouts and deposit insurance funds tend to provide greater leeway for banks to engage 
in excessive risk taking or more reckless economic behavior because both moral hazard 
and regulatory penalties are low (Macey and O’Hara, 2003).  
Overall, the peculiarities of banking operations generate multiple agency costs and 
weaken the effectiveness of several governance mechanisms to mitigate them. Agency 
conflicts are even more complex within the context of Islamic banking. In addition to 
the traditional conflicts, that is, agent–principal, majority–minority shareholding, and 
shareholders–creditors (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Smith, 1985; Bowie 
and Freeman, 1992; La Porta et al., 1999), Islamic banks face other conflict: the one 
between the depositors and the managers. This conflict instigates further agency costs 
and increased legal liability for managers in these banks. Since Islamic banks are 
prohibited from charging interest, which is considered usury, depositors are contracted 
as IAHs through an equity-based investment contract (Mudarabah). This contract 
requires profits from investments to be shared between the bank and the IAHs according 
to a mutually agreed-upon proportion. Investment losses are completely borne by the 
IAHs (depositors) unless they arise from misconduct or negligence by the bank 
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(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Belal et al., 2015). In practice, the majority of Islamic 
banks do not empower IAHs to directly monitor their investment through representation 
on the board of directors. This increases the risk of exploitation of the IAHs by the bank 
managers (Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002) and may heighten their agency costs. 
Because the IAHs cannot directly monitor their investment funds, they must track them 
indirectly through published financial information.  
The depositor–manager conflict implies additional agency costs in Islamic banks 
and highlights a greater need to strictly control for bias in financial reporting, which 
serves as one of the main sources of information for IAHs (Abdel Karim and Archer, 
2002; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). On the other hand, previous research argues that 
organizational religiosity induces social norms7 that suppress opportunistic behavior of 
bank managers (Weaver and Agle, 2002). Religiously oriented organizations are 
expected to follow strict moral constraints that shape the particular context of their 
economic operations. These constraints are also expected to enhance organizational 
morality. Previous literature argues that when corporations have well-defined moral 
guidelines or structures that all members can easily follow, the morally responsible 
behavior of individuals within the corporations improves (Kaptein, 2011; Ha-
Brookshire, 2015). 
In addition, the religious concept of Islamic accountability extends the moral 
accountability of Islamic banks’ actors (managers, board of directors, and SSB 
members) beyond their legal liability. This accountability compels these actors to 
pursue the best interests of the bank’s wider stakeholders as well as to maximize the 
value of the shareholders’ and depositors’ (IAHs’) investments and to protect them (see 
Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Belal et al., 2015). These actions fulfill the religious 
obligation of Amana (trust), which requires the banks’ actors to behave according to 
                                                            
7 Social norms are the external rules “shared by a group, sustained both by sanctions and by emotions of guilt and 
shame, whose primary characteristic is that it enjoins its followers to forgo selfish benefits in the name of group 
benefits” (Festre, 2010, p. 514). Individuals tend to comply with the understandings and expectations of their peer 
groups to avoid sanctions associated with non-adherence to prevailing values and beliefs. Moreover, accepted 
attitudes are usually rewarded with social approval and strong community support (Leventis et al., 2013). Prior 
literature demonstrates that economic behavior actually depends on the beliefs or actions of the community (Romer, 
1984). In this sense, social norms constitute the main driving forces or motivational mechanisms for market 
participants (Dyreng et al., 2012). 
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the principles of Adl (justice), Qist (balance), and Ihsaan (perfection) (Beekun and 
Badawi, 2005). Therefore, we expect managers of Islamic banks, as actors in religiously 
oriented organizations, to prioritize ethical choices in measuring and reporting financial 
transactions. In other words, greater moral accountability constraints on Islamic banks’ 
actors are expected to conditionally lead to lower agency costs in these banks. This 
moral accountability is likely to reduce risk-taking behavior (more conservatism) and 
discourage or mitigate earnings management practices. Accordingly, higher 
transparency is conjectured to exist for this banking sector in comparison with 
conventional counterparts.  
Moreover, all Islamic banks appoint an SSB, which operates as an additional 
governance mechanism. The SSB’s primary objective is to ensure that Islamic banks 
operate in accordance with the ethos of Shariah (Beekun and Badawi, 2005). The 
existence of this second layer of governance is expected to additionally limit 
opportunities for financial misstatements and consequently moderate the higher agency 
costs in Islamic banks (Mensah, 2014).  
Figure 1 illustrates the governance framework of Islamic banks and the interactions 
between a bank’s various actors (i.e., managers, the board of directors, and the SSB) 
and its major stakeholders (i.e., depositors, creditors, and shareholders). It also depicts 
the impact of organizational religiosity on agency costs and the reporting behavior of 
Islamic banks.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Against this theoretical framework, we expect that Islamic banks may exhibit 
important differences from conventional banks in terms of earnings management and 
accounting conservatism. To measure the quality of financial reporting (Walker, 2013), 
we develop testable hypotheses on conservatism and earnings management 
respectively. 
Conservatism is an important valuation concept in accounting because it requires 
one to proceed cautiously if the measurement of financial numbers is uncertain (Epstein 
and Jermakowicz, 2007). According to Basu (1997), conservatism calls for a higher 
verifiability threshold for recognizing gains compared to losses. Conservatism is 
beneficial for financial statements because it reduces managerial opportunism, 
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mitigates agency problems associated with managerial investment decisions (Ahmed 
and Duellman, 2007; Basu, 2005), enables efficient debt agreements in the context of 
asymmetric information (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; García Lara et al., 2009), reduces 
litigation, and assists in the efficient valuation of claims (LaFond and Watts, 2008). 
Thus, conservatism motivates managers to cut losses earlier and abandon poorly 
performing projects (García-Lara et al., 2009). 
Accounting conservatism can be particularly important for banks because of the 
sector’s complexities, intense information asymmetries, opacity, and contracting 
particularities (Levine, 2004; Leventis et al., 2013). Regulators prefer conservative 
financial reporting by firms to avoid complications or litigation if they become 
insolvent (Watts, 2003). In particular, central bankers prefer prudent practices, such as 
increased loan provisions, during economic upturns (Turner, 1997; Leventis et al., 
2013).  
Religious organizations are likely to be more conservative and risk averse than other 
organizations (Osoba, 2003; Hilary and Hu, 2009). The double-layer governance and 
the moral accountability constraints of Islamic banks’ managers are expected to 
moderate the higher agency conflicts in these banks. These managers are expected to 
operate in ways that avoid excessive social and moral costs (Callen and Fang, 2013; 
Belal et al., 2015), and therefore they are less likely to withhold bad news for personal 
gain. Accordingly, we hypothesize that 
 
H1: Islamic banks are more conservative than conventional banks in their financial 
reporting practices. 
 
Scheiner (1981) provides evidence that banks employ loan loss provisions (LLPs) 
as an important tool for earnings management. Also, Ma (1988) and Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988) report that bank managers tend to raise LLPs during periods of high 
operating income in order to decrease the volatility of reported earnings. This 
conclusion is also supported by several studies focusing on the U.S. banking industry 
(see Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Liu et al., 1997; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Wahlen, 1994; 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012), which all conclude that banks use LLPs as a tool 
for aggressive earnings management (manipulation). Studies using non-U.S. bank 
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samples arrive at similar conclusions (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2008). 
Beatty et al. (2002) demonstrate that banks, in addition to using LLPs, manage reported 
earnings by manipulating security gains and losses. Shrieves and Dahl (2003) and 
Agarwal et al. (2007) conclude that Japanese banks used security gains and LLPs to 
manage earnings during 1985–1999. Hazera (2005) reaches the same conclusion for 
Mexican banks, and Shen and Chih (2005) report evidence of significant income 
management (manipulation) in several countries.  
Nevertheless, managers of religiously affiliated organizations are more likely to 
adopt certain social norms associated with anti-manipulative behavior. Dyreng et al. 
(2012) argue that religion is an institutionalized control mechanism that affects 
individual and corporate attitudes. Moreover, McGuire et al. (2012) report a significant 
association between firms being headquartered in areas with strong religious, social, 
and ethical codes and lower incidences of financial reporting irregularities. Grullon et 
al. (2010) find that firms located in counties in the United States with higher levels of 
religiosity are less likely to be named in class action securities lawsuits or to engage in 
backdating options. They are also less likely to grant excessive compensation packages 
to their managers or to practice aggressive earnings management. These findings align 
with previous research studies arguing that individuals with strong religious beliefs tend 
to reject morally questionable decisions in any business environment (McCullough and 
Willoughby, 2009; Vitell, 2009). 
Consequently, we argue that religiously oriented banks are less likely than 
conventional banks to manipulate both the flow and the quality of corporate information 
(Barro and McCleary, 2003; Callen and Fang, 2013). Therefore, organizational 
religiosity acts as a powerful deterrent to making accounting misstatements and availing 
of earnings management opportunities. We thus argue that Islamic banks operating 
under strict religious norms report financial numbers of enhanced quality as measured 
by lower earnings management. Our second research hypothesis is formed as follows: 
 
H2: Islamic banks are associated with lower earnings management compared to 
conventional banks. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
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3.1. Data selection procedure 
To test our predictions, we focused on the MENA region, which has the highest 
concentration of Islamic banks in the world. Drawing upon different data sets, namely, 
Datastream, Thomson Reuters’ Zawya, and Bloomberg, we found 158 listed banks in 
the MENA region. These banks were further filtered considering (a) availability of 
corporate governance (i.e., board of directors and ownership structure) data for the 
entire period under investigation (2008–2013) and (b) availability of at least four banks 
in each country included for analysis (Beck et al., 2013). Our final sample contained 
financial data from 12 MENA countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). This sample included 100 banks, 24 of which are denoted as Islamic and 76 of 
which are conventional, yielding 600 bank-year observations for analysis. All financial 
data were extracted from Bankscope and The Financial Times’ Banker databases, while 
corporate governance and ownership data were extracted from Thomson Reuters’ 
Zawya. The final sample distribution is presented in Appendix A. 
 
3.2. Measuring accounting conservatism 
Our first measure of accounting quality refers to accounting conservatism, 
represented by the timely recognition of LLPs relative to non-performing loans 
(Leventis et al., 2013). Nichols et al. (2009) argue that a bank’s loan loss accounting 
reflects its credit risk management behavior and can create substantial information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders. Within this framework, LLPs are 
expenses reflecting managers’ valuation of future loan losses. Thus, banks that engage 
in conservative accounting recognize LLPs that are larger and in more timely manner 
relative to the variations in non-performing loans (Nichols et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 
2013). To test for the differences in the timeliness of Islamic banks and conventional 
banks in recognizing LLPs, we followed Nichols et al. (2009) and Leventis et al. (2013) 
by associating LLPs with lagged, contemporaneous, and future changes in non-
performing loans (ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLt, and ΔNPLit+1, respectively)8. We controlled for 
                                                            
8 Nonperforming - loans refer to loans that are due but not yet paid by debtors for at least 90 days. They are either 
in default or close to default.  
12 
 
 
 
differences in loan charge-offs9 for both current (LCOit) and future years (LCOit+1), and 
we formalized this test by estimating Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model, as adopted 
by Nichols et al. (2009): 
 
LLPsit = a0 + a1ΔNPLit-1 + a2ΔNPLit + a3ΔNPLit+1 + a4LCOit + a5LCOit+1  
          + a6IBsit*ΔNPLit-1 + a7IBsit*ΔNPLit + a8IBsit*ΔNPLit+ + a9IBsit*LCOit  
          + a10IBsit*LCOit+1 + a11-18GOVit + a19-28CONTROLit + ac29-33YR_DUMMIES + eit  [1]
                                                                                            
Where: 
LLPs = ratio of loan loss provisions for year t to total loans in year t-
1 
ΔNPL = change in non-performing loans between two years, deflated 
by total loans in year t-1 
LCO = loan charge-offs for year t, deflated by total loans in year t-1 
IBs = dummy receiving 1 for Islamic banks, and 0 otherwise 
GOV = a vector of governance and ownership variables  
CONTROL = a vector of control variables 
YR_DUMMIES = year dummies 
 
For Model [1], our primary predictions are that the coefficients a6, a7, and a8 on 
IBsit*ΔNPLit-1, IBsit*ΔNPLit, and IBsit*ΔNPLit+1 are positive. This indicates that 
Islamic banks recognize larger or more timely LLPs relative to changes in non-
performing loans compared to conventional banks. Consistent with prior studies 
(Nichols et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2013), we expect the coefficients a1, a2, a3, a4, and 
a5 on ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLit, ΔNPLit+1, LCOit, and LCOit+1 to have positive signs. We expect 
the lagged present and future changes in non-performing loans (ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLit, and 
ΔNPLit+1) to be positively related to LLPs (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). We also expect 
net loan charge-offs (LCOit, and LCOit+1) to be positively related to LLPs because loan 
charge-offs provide information about the future collectability of loans (see Beaver and 
                                                            
9 Loan charge-offs refer to uncollectible loans that are subsequently written off. This is a type of bad debt expense 
that should be charged to the income statement. 
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Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). Although the Nichols et al. (2009) model 
requires continuous time-series data, which constrains the sample size (Beatty and Liao, 
2011), it is the most appropriate research design for measuring conservatism in the 
banking industry (Leventis et al., 2013). 
3.3. Measuring earnings management 
Following Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012), we employ three different metrics 
for earnings management. The first measure identifies small positive income as a target 
of earnings management. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Leuz et al. (2003), and Barth 
et al. (2008) use the frequency of small positive net income as an indicator of managing 
earnings. The underlying expectation is that managers aim to report a small positive net 
income rather than negative net income for various reasons, such as the manipulation 
of the stock market, avoidance of debt covenants, and even the achievement of earnings 
targets for receiving bonuses (Leventis et al., 2013). Based on hypothesis 2, we expect 
Islamic banks to report a small positive net income less frequently than conventional 
banks.  
To test this assertion, we followed Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Lang et al. 
(2003), and Barth et al. (2008) and estimated a dummy variable SPOS that equals 1 if 
net income deflated by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01 for each given year, 
and 0 otherwise. We then introduced SPOS as the dependent variable in the following 
logit regression model: 
 
SPOSit = a0 + a1EBTit + a2IBsit*EBTit + a3-10GOVit + c11-19CONTROLit  
                + c20-24YR_DUMMIES + eit                                                                  (2) 
Where: 
EBT = earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. The 
remaining variables are as previously defined. 
 
A negative coefficient on the IBsit*EBTit variable indicates that Islamic banks report 
small positive income less frequently than conventional banks.  
Our second metric for earnings management is based on using LLPs and realized 
security gains and losses as mechanisms for aggressive earnings management 
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(Anandarajan et al., 2007; Beatty et al., 2002; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012). LLPs 
and realized security gains and losses combine a nondiscretionary component, which 
brings loan loss allowances to an acceptable level, and a discretionary portion, which 
is closely regulated (Cornett et al., 2009). Therefore, in order to produce a salient 
estimate of the earnings management behavior of banks via the manipulation of LLPs, 
we estimated the discretionary part of LLPs and realized security gains and losses. We 
followed Cornett et al. (2009) and Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) and estimated 
the following fixed-effect OLS regression model for calculating the discretionary part 
of LLPs: 
LOSSit =   at + b1lnTAit + b2NPLit + b3LLRit + b4LOANRit + b5LOANCit + b6LOANIit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
+ εit              (a)   
  
Where: 
LOSS = loan loss provisions deflated by total loans 
lnTA = natural logarithm of total assets 
NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans 
LLR = ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans 
LOANR = ratio of real estate loans to total loans 
LOANC = ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans 
LOANI = ratio of consumer and installment loans to total loans 
 
The discretionary component of LLPs (DLLP) is the error term from the above 
regression. Following Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012), we standardized the error 
term by the ratio of total loans to total assets and defined DLLPit as 
(ε*LOANS)/ASSETS, where LOANS is total loans and ASSETS is total assets. 
The next step is to estimate the discretionary part of realized security gains and losses 
(RSGL). Following Cornett et al. (2009), we estimated the following fixed effects 
regression model as 
RSGLit= at + b1lnTAit + b2URSGLit + εit                                                                   (b) 
 
Where: 
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RSGL = realized security gains and losses deflated by total assets 
lnTA = natural logarithm of total assets 
URSGL = unrealized security gains and losses deflated by total assets 
 
 
The error term of regression (b) is the discretionary part of the realized security gains 
and losses. Our measure of earnings management (EM) is the difference between the 
discretionary part of RSGL and the discretionary part of LLPs. Higher levels of EM 
increase earnings and vice versa; that is, higher levels of EM correspond to increased 
earnings management. 
The EM proxy is estimated from the previous step and introduced as the dependent 
variable in the following regression model in which all independent variables are 
defined as before: 
 
EMit = a0 + a1EBTit + a2IBsit*EBTit + a3-10GOVit + c11-19CONTROLit  
                + c20-24YR_DUMMIES + eit                                                                 (3) 
We expect a negative coefficient on the IBsit*EBTit variable, which indicates Islamic 
banks exhibit less aggressive earnings management behavior.  
Our third and final measure of earnings management is discretionary accruals 
estimated from the Jones (1991) model and modified by Yasuda et al. (2004) for 
banking institutions. We ran the following regression to obtain the discretionary part of 
the total accruals of the banks: 
 
ACCRt = c1(1/TAt-1) + c2(ΔΟΙt/TAt-1) + c3(BREt/TAt-1) + et                            (c) 
 
Where: 
ACCR = total accruals estimated as the difference between net income and 
operating cash flows  
TA = total assets 
ΔΟI = change in a bank’s operating income between t-1 to t 
BRE = bank’s premises and equipment. 
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All variables and the intercept are deflated with lagged total assets to reduce 
heteroskedasticity in the error term. The residuals from equation (c) are denoted as the 
discretionary portion (DACC) of total accruals, which depends on managerial 
discretion and is our primary variable of interest. In the following step, we introduce it 
as the dependent variable: 
DACCit = a0 + a1EBTit + a2IBsit*EBTit + a3-10GOVit + c11-19CONTROLit  
               + c20-24YR_DUMMIES + eit                                              (4) 
 
All models include year dummies to capture time-specific effects and to offset the 
problem of heteroskedasticity in the error term. As in the previous models, we expect a 
negative coefficient on the IBsit*EBTit variable, which indicates that Islamic banks 
exhibit a lower magnitude of discretionary accruals and have less earnings 
management. All the models were tested for potential endogeneity (Kennedy, 2008; 
Koutsoyiannis, 1977) by applying the Hausman (1978) simultaneity specification test, 
as suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991). Our results indicate no serious 
endogeneity problems: our dependent variable does not lead to biased or inconsistent 
OLS estimates. 
3.4. Governance and ownership variables 
 
All the models include variables to reflect governance and ownership structure for 
both Islamic and conventional banks. According to Brown et al. (2011), board and 
ownership structures are significant determinants of accounting quality and managerial 
accounting choices. For this reason, we introduced variables to reflect CEO duality, 
board independence, and state and foreign ownership. For definitions see Appendix B. 
 Some prior literature suggests that CEO duality enhances corporate value through a 
thorough knowledge of the strategies and the operations of the firm (Brown et al., 
2011). However, where accounting issues are concerned, other literature provides 
strong evidence that boards independent from the CEO perform their monitoring role 
and mitigate earnings management behavior better (see Klein, 2002; Mitchell, 2005; 
Chang and Sun, 2010). That is to say, CEO duality is associated with more earnings 
management and less conditional conservatism. 
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Board independence is measured as the ratio of independent members to total board 
members. A large body of research shows a strong negative correlation between board 
independence and earnings management. Marnet (2008), Klein (2002), Persons (2006), 
Iqbal and Strong (2010), Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), and Beekes et al. (2004) 
all argue that independent boards contribute toward the integrity and quality of financial 
statements. Consequently, we expect a negative coefficient on that variable in the 
earnings management models and a positive coefficient in the conservatism Model [1]. 
In addition, prior literature (Megginson et al., 1994; Wang and Yung, 2011; Shleifer, 
1998) demonstrates that state-owned firms are associated with higher earnings 
management. However, Laidroo (2009) and Wang and Yung (2011) report the opposite 
effect. Therefore, we form no strong expectation on the impact of state ownership. 
Beyond earnings management, state ownership has a significant impact on firms’ 
accounting conservatism. The general finding is that state ownership has a negative 
impact on accounting conservatism (Cullinan et al., 2012). 
Finally, we consider foreign ownership. According to Laidroo (2009), foreign 
owners tend to be large international firms that operate in several countries. With less 
of a need to acquire outside financing from the local market, subsidiary firms may have 
diminished accounting quality. However, Xu et al. (2012) find that internationally 
owned firms present the highest accounting quality across all types of ownership 
structure groups (private, state, employee, etc.).  
 
3.5. Control variables 
Our first control variable is bank size (SIZE), measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Because analysts tend to follow larger banks (Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 
2012), these banks are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management 
(Cornett et al., 2009). Thus, we expect a negative coefficient on the SIZE variable for 
the earnings management models. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservatism is 
less evident for larger firms because they provide more publicly available information 
and use multiple information dissemination techniques. Givoly et al. (2007) find that 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings for large firms differs from that of small firms. In 
contrast, Callen et al. (2010) argue that large firms, facing lower operational 
uncertainty, demand greater accounting conservatism.  
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The second control variable is leverage (LEV), which is measured as the ratio of 
total debt to common equity. Riskier banks may inflate accounting earnings for reasons 
related to capital adequacy requirements and regulatory scrutiny (Cornett et al., 2009; 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012). Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on LEV. In 
addition, we use a control for tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (CAP). Regulators scrutinize 
capitalized banks less, which allows more opportunities for managing earnings (Cornett 
et al., 2009). However, the managers of low-capitalized firms might have more 
incentives to manage earnings in order to avoid sanctions. Anandarajan et al. (2007) 
provide significant results on the impact of CAP on earnings management behavior. 
Consequently, the association between capital adequacy and both earnings management 
and conservatism may not be monotonic. Thus, we cannot infer any predictions about 
the sign of this coefficient. 
We control for banks’ growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio (GRW). 
Lai (2009) indicates that firms with increased growth opportunities are less likely to 
report discretionary accruals, especially when they experience increased monitoring. 
Banks are generally more regulated and more closely monitored compared with other 
institutions, and they may be associated with less earnings management. Therefore, we 
expect the coefficient on GRW to be negative. Additionally, Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2007) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that the market-to-book ratio 
reflects the composition of equity value, which is determined by the investment 
opportunities of the firm and the past asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Therefore, we 
expect GRW to have a positive association with conservatism. 
We also control for audit quality by including a dummy variable (AUDQ) that 
indicates that a bank is audited by one of the Big Four audit firms, which are expected 
to produce high-quality financial statements (Gul et al., 2006; Park and Pincus, 2001). 
In addition, Leventis et al. (2013) suggest that banks audited by the Big Four audit firms 
have a higher level of LLPs relative to nonperforming loans, indicating higher 
conditional conservatism. Consequently, we expect a negative coefficient on this 
variable for the earnings management models and a positive coefficient for the 
conservatism model. Furthermore, we control for bank financial performance, 
measured as net cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets 
(CFO). High-performing firms that tend to use more conservative accounting (Ahmed 
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and Duellman, 2007; Leventis et al., 2013) are less motivated to manage their 
accounting numbers. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient on CFO to be positive for 
the conservatism model and negative for the earnings management model. We also 
control for lagged loan loss allowance deflated by total loans (LLAt-1) on the 
conditional conservatism model since we expect banks with high LLAit-1 to have lower 
LLPs in the current period (if banks that are over-reserved recognize lower provisions 
in the next period) (Liu and Ryan, 2006; Leventis et al., 2013). 
Our last set of control variables comprises country-specific variables. The first is a 
dummy receiving unity (1) for a country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) group, 
and zero (0) otherwise. This dummy variable controls for differences in accounting 
quality among the monarchies and wealthy Gulf countries, where banks may have 
different incentives for accounting quality. A second dummy (TURC) is unity (1) for 
banks originating in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, and zero (0) otherwise. The TURC 
variable represents three countries that experienced political turmoil during the years 
2011-2013, which significantly affected their economy. Leuz et al. (2003) document 
how corruption is a significant determinant of corporate accounting quality; therefore, 
the third country variable is the level of corruption (CORRUPT) taken from the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators. CORRUPT takes values between 0 and 100, with 
the highest value indicating a higher level of corruption among the government and 
officials.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample variables for the full sample. 
Islamic banks are found to have lower mean values of all earnings management 
measures relative to conventional banks. Islamic banks report small positive income 
(between 0.00 and 0.01) less frequently, and they have fewer discretional accruals as 
well as lower discretionary LLPs relative to discretionary security gains and losses. 
These results are the first indication that Islamic banks present relatively higher 
accounting quality, confirming results reported by Elnahass et al. (2014). Islamic banks 
also have relatively lower government and foreign ownership than conventional banks, 
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and Islamic banks separate the roles of the CEO and board chairman more often. Board 
independence is similar between the two categories of banks. With respect to the 
remaining variables, Islamic banks have a less-risky loan portfolio, as illustrated by 
fewer changes in nonperforming loans, loan charge-offs, and loan loss allowances and 
more LLPs. In addition, Islamic banks are more capitalized, have less negative stock 
returns and are less leveraged, which aligns with the findings of Beck et al. (2013).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3, Panel A presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Islamic banks are 
negatively correlated with all earnings management measures, but the correlation is 
significant only with SPOS, indicating that Islamic banks tend to smooth their income 
towards positive numbers less frequently. In addition, Islamic banks are negatively 
correlated with foreign and government ownership as well as with board independence. 
Moreover, Islamic banks are negatively correlated with LEV but positively correlated 
with AUDQ and CAP, suggesting that Islamic banks are more capitalized and likely to 
have been audited by the Big Four audit firms. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the conditional 
conservatism model. Islamic banks are positively and significantly correlated with 
LLPs, indicating that they tend to recognize more LLPs. Furthermore, SIZE is 
negatively correlated with FOR_OWN, DUAL, and BODIND. Also, LEV is found to 
be positively correlated with ΔNPLt+1, indicating that highly leveraged banks tend to 
have more future nonperforming loans. Finally, AUDQ is negatively correlated with 
GOV_OWN and DUAL, indicating that Big Four audit firms tend not to audit state-
owned banks and banks with more concentrated management control.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4.2. Results on conservatism and earnings management 
The results from the estimation of Model [1] are presented in Table 4. The regression 
F-stat is highly significant. Islamic banks recognize LLPs based more on the changes 
between past and future nonperforming loans instead of loan charge-offs because the 
coefficients on IBs*ΔNPLit-1 and IBs*ΔNPLit+1 are positive and significant. This result 
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can be interpreted as an increase by a unity of future non-performing loans leading to 
an approximately 3% increase to current LLPs. The results show that Islamic banks 
follow a more conservative accounting policy for recognizing LLPs. This could be 
explained by Islamic banks basing their loan loss provisioning decisions on the actual 
changes in nonperforming loans and on their managers’ expectations about the 
nonperforming loans in the following year, before the nonperforming loans are 
charged-off on the bank’s income statement. This result is in line with expectations for 
the impact of both the moral accountability constraints and the added governance in 
Islamic banks on reducing agency costs to depositors, creditors, and shareholders of 
Islamic banks. This implies a higher conservatism and higher accounting quality in 
Islamic banks.  
In addition, the coefficients on the variables of the current change of nonperforming 
loans (ΔNPLit) and the current and future level of loan charge-offs (LCOit, LCOit+1) are 
positive and statically significant, which is similar to findings in prior research and our 
expectations. These results imply that an increase by a unity in current nonperforming 
loans (ΔNPLit) and loan charge-offs (LCOit) leads to increases of 4.8% and 
approximately 8.2% in LLPs, respectively, which are economically significant. This 
increase of LLPs generated from ΔNPLit and LCOit indicates significant degree of 
accounting conservatism.  
With regard to the governance and ownership variables, the only significant 
coefficient is positive for the IBs*BODIND interaction variable. This is consistent with 
the assumption that Islamic banks with increased board independence recognize more 
LLPs, which aligns with previous literature regarding the positive impact of board 
independence on accounting quality (Brown et al., 2011; Beekes et al., 2004). The 
results indicate that Islamic banks are more conservative reporters of LLPs. Finally, the 
only significant control variables are the lagged level of loan loss allowances (LLA), 
audit quality (AUDQ), and growth (GRW), which are positive. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 5 presents the empirical findings from the three earnings management model 
estimations. The Wald χ2 (as a test for the statistical significance of each coefficient in 
the model) is significant for the logit model (SPOS), and the F-stats are significant for 
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the EM and DACC models. As the main variable of interest in the interaction between 
IBs and earnings before taxes, IBs*EBT is negative and statistically significant in all 
earnings management models. This is consistent with the assumption that Islamic banks 
report small positive income less often, have less discretionary accruals, and experience 
a relatively small difference between discretionary LLPs and RSGL. These results 
indicate that Islamic banks are less likely to manipulate their income numbers. The 
IBs*EBT coefficient under the EM model is negative and significant (-0.049). 
Compared to the insignificant EBT coefficient, the IBs*EBT coefficient result can be 
interpreted as Islamic banks manipulating LLPs and security gains and losses less often 
to achieve earnings targets. Overall, we argue that the quality of financial reporting of 
Islamic banks is enhanced by their moral accountability constraints and more broadly 
religious norms constraints in restricting earnings management. 
The variable of state ownership (GOV_OWN) is negative and significant in the 
SPOS and DACC models. This is consistent with the assumption that an increase in 
state ownership is associated with less earnings management, either through reporting 
small positive income or manipulating discretionary accruals. This finding corroborates 
arguments from prior literature that firms under state ownership have less need for 
outside financing, which in turn reduces motives for earnings management (Wang and 
Yung, 2011; Ding et al., 2007; Laidroo, 2009). The coefficient on state ownership for 
Islamic banks (IBs*GOV_OWN) is not significant. Foreign ownership, however, may 
be correlated with the decision of bank managers to manage discretionary LLPs for 
achieving earnings targets. The coefficient on FOR_OWN is positive and significant in 
the EM model, which signals that banks with higher foreign ownership have more 
discretionary LLPs relative to RSGL, by up to 0.5%. This result suggests that these 
banks manipulate their income statements more often, which accords with Laidroo 
(2009). However, the opposite effect applies for Islamic banks (IBs*FOR_OWN). The 
respective coefficient is negative and significant in the EM and SPOS models, 
suggesting that Islamic banks manage their financial statements less often, even under 
the control of a foreign investor. This finding corroborates our previous arguments that 
Islamic banks are associated with enhanced accounting quality. 
The finding is still supported when we look at the variables for the composition of 
the board of directors (i.e., CEO duality and board independence). The respective 
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coefficient for Islamic banks (IBs*DUAL) is non-significant. Regarding board 
independence, the coefficient for IBs*BODIND is negative and significant for Islamic 
banks, indicating that board independence enhances their financial reporting quality 
compared to conventional banks. The coefficient for CEO duality (DUAL) is positive 
and significant in the EM model, indicating that boards with CEO duality (which 
indicates lower board monitoring) engage more in earnings management. This leads to 
the recommendation that in conventional banks, additional governance mechanisms 
should be employed, in conjunction with board composition to improve their financial 
reporting quality. 
Regarding the control variables, only SIZE, LEV, and CAP are positive and 
significant. In addition, banks in GCC countries report relatively higher discretionary 
accruals than those in non-GCC countries, indicating that banks in GCC countries 
overstate their earnings. The positive coefficients for LEV and CAP are in accordance 
with the regulatory capital management theory, and they suggest that riskier banks (high 
LEV) tend to artificially inflate accounting earnings for reasons related to capital 
adequacy requirements and regulatory scrutiny (Cornett et al., 2009; Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, 2012). Furthermore, well-capitalized banks (high CAP) have greater 
opportunities for earnings management because they undergo less scrutiny by 
regulators (Cornett et al., 2009). Finally, the SIZE coefficient is negative and 
significant, which aligns with our expectations. This finding supports the argument that 
small-sized banks engage in manipulative techniques in order to achieve earnings 
targets that international and local investors and debtors consider appropriate.  
The overall results, based on the three tested empirical models for EM, shed light on 
the influence of the additional governance and the moral accountability constraints 
within Islamic banks. They act as important mechanisms in mitigating opportunistic 
behavior and hence, controlling the overall agency costs in these banks compared to 
their conventional counterparts, which usually operate under a single layer of 
governance.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Moreover, we test the impact of bank type on the decision of the auditor selection, 
as a measure of audit quality (Landsman et al., 2009). Studies in prior literature argue 
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that auditors influence earnings quality since their role is to restrict incidents of 
financial misstatement and managerial discretion (Dechow et al., 2010). We estimate a 
logit regression model using a dummy (AUDQ) as the dependent variable that receives 
unity (1) for banks audited by one of the world’s four largest international audit firms 
(Big Four), and zero (0) otherwise. The other variables are the control and governance 
variables used in the previous models. Therefore, the logit model has the following 
form:  
AUDQit = a0 + a1EBT +a2IBs +a3GOV_OWN +a4FOR_OWN + a5DUAL  
              + a6BODIND + a7SIZE + a8LEV + a9CAPt + a10GRW + a11CFOt  
              + a12GCC+ a13TURCt + a14-18YR_DUMMIES + eit [5] 
The results are presented in Table 6. The coefficient for the IBs variable is positive 
and significant: Islamic banks tend to hire the Big Four audit firms for their statutory 
audits. This result is in line with the main finding of this study; that is, Islamic banks 
report earnings of higher quality. These results imply that the auditor selection decision 
is likely to have a substantial influence on promoting higher earnings quality and 
conservatism in Islamic banks.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3. Sensitivity analyses 
We performed 10 sensitivity tests to assess the validity of our findings. In the first 
test, following Leventis et al. (2013), we checked for any potential effect that the control 
variables (SIZE, CAP, CFO, GRW, LEV, and AUDQ) might have on the conservatism 
measure by including interaction terms between each control variable and our measure 
of conservatism. Therefore, all control variables were interacted with  
ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLit, ΔNPLit+1, LCOit, and LCOit+1 in Model [1]. The results are 
unaffected. 
Second, to control for possible bias arising from the sign on the difference in 
nonperforming loans (whether the change is positive or negative), we re-estimated 
Model [1], allowing the coefficient on the change in nonperforming loans (ΔNPL) to 
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vary. Untabulated findings provided qualitatively similar results to those presented in 
Table 3. 
Third, following Clinch and Magliolo (1993), who argue that discretionary LLPs 
and RSGL should not be combined into a single earnings management variable, we re-
estimated Model [3] to include discretionary LLPs and realized security gains and 
losses separately as our measure of earnings management. The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
Fourth, in order to capture any biases in the estimation of discretionary accruals, we 
eliminated the upper and lower 1% of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and 
re-estimated Model [3] as in Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012). This had no 
significant impact on the main findings.  
Fifth, we removed some of the restrictions in the sample selection procedure and 
included countries that have fewer than four banks in their utilized databases. The 
results remain relatively unchanged. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the models 
is significantly reduced, probably due to a higher sample variability. 
Sixth, we included additional country-related variables in all models, such as GDP 
growth, rule of law regulatory quality, government efficiency, and bank concentration 
ratio to control for additional factors. The results are unaffected. 
Seventh, all models were re-estimated after we changed the definition of some 
control variables. GOV_OWN and FOR_OWN were replaced by dummies receiving 
unity (1) for those banks that have foreign and state ownership above 50%. SIZE was 
re-estimated as the logarithm of the market value of equity, and LEV and GRW were 
re-measured as long-term debt to total assets and the annual percentage change of 
interest income, respectively. The results are unaffected. 
Eighth, we controlled for the impact of the 2011 political turmoil in the Middle East 
and tested whether it affected the accounting quality of Islamic banks and conventional 
banks. While the political turmoil was more prevalent in specific MENA counties, we 
further considered whether its wider impact in this region was more pronounced for 
specific types of banks and conducted a sensitivity test. Thus, we re-estimated all 
models after separating the sample into the pre-turmoil (2008–2010) and post-turmoil 
(2011–2013) periods. The results indicate that the conservatism of Islamic banks 
increased during the post-turmoil period, but no change occurred for conventional 
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banks. Interestingly, conventional banks seemed to exercise more earnings 
management via discretionary accruals and LLPs than Islamic banks after the turmoil 
period. 
Ninth, we re-estimated Model [2] by dividing our sample into countries belonging 
to the GCC group, which are the most affluent in the MENA region, and countries with 
political turmoil during 2011 and 2013 (i.e., Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia). The findings 
suggest that only Islamic banks in the countries that experienced political turmoil 
exercised less income smoothing than conventional banks, a finding that corroborates 
the result in Table 5. 
Tenth, we controlled for the impact of adopting the incurred loan loss model10 
employed by Islamic banks in Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar as opposed to the expected 
loan loss model11, which is currently proposed by the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). We found that Islamic banks seem to report less discretionary 
accruals and to be more conservative in relation to conventional banks. These results 
confirm our initial findings on Islamic banks’ enhanced earning quality. Also, banks 
with government ownership are associated with less discretionary accruals; in contrast, 
conventional banks with foreign ownership manipulate their earnings more often in 
comparison to Islamic banks.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of religious norms on the quality of financial 
reporting of MENA-listed banks during 2008–2013. We drew upon both agency and 
social norm theories. We also discussed the unique governance framework of Islamic 
banks, featuring additional depositor–manager conflict, the extra layer of governance 
(SSB), and the moral accountability constraints in these banks. In that context, we 
expected that the opportunistic behavior by corporate actors would be suppressed.  
Our main findings demonstrate that Islamic banks are more conservative because 
they recognize more LLPs relative to non-performing loans and loan charge-offs. 
                                                            
10 The incurred loan loss model is based on estimating loan loss provisions for incurred losses as a result of an 
objective evidence of impairment for a financial asset. 
11 The expected loan loss model estimates loan loss provisions based on a forward-looking approach for potential 
credit losses during economic downturns. 
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Additionally, Islamic banks are less likely to manage earnings than conventional banks 
because they are less likely to report small positive income that is close to zero and they 
report fewer cases of discretionary accruals. Additionally, they engage the Big Four 
audit firms more frequently.  
Accordingly, we suggest that the strict religious orientation of Islamic banks 
motivates managers to raise the quality of financial reporting and to reduce agency costs 
for stakeholders, including depositors, creditors, and shareholders.  
Our study is of particular importance because of the unique institutional 
characteristics of the Islamic finance industry, the rapid increase in its size, and the 
interconnectedness of the global economic system. The contribution of the paper is 
threefold. First, we show that religious norms play a major role in influencing 
managerial decision-making in the context of less-developed capital markets, which are 
characterized by weak control institutions and relatively ineffective enforcement 
mechanisms. We also expand the extant literature by moving beyond the U.S. context. 
Second, our findings substantiate the view that social norms affect financial reporting 
and auditing at the global level. Finally, we bring to the fore contexts in which Islamic 
values predominate, illuminating the global role of religious norms in accountability, 
transparency, and business ethics.  
The implications of our research are important for market participants and 
regulators. Investors and analysts should factor into their analyses the important role of 
strong religious adherence in improving the quality of financial reporting and reducing 
agency costs. Moreover, auditors and regulators should view religious adherence and 
the moral accountability constraints as being complementary mechanisms to statutory 
auditing; they may therefore, adjust their efforts accordingly.  
Our study has certain limitations that create avenues for future research. First, our 
study is limited to the MENA region, which reduces our ability to generalize important 
findings. Future researchers could expand on our research to cover Islamic countries in 
other parts of the world and thereby enrich the understanding offered by this study. 
Secondly, our research design does not focus on the individual, but rather on the impact 
of religiosity at the level of the bank. Future researchers could employ interviews and 
questionnaires with management staff to interpret the impact of individual religiosity 
on decision-making. 
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Table 1. A comparison between Islamic and conventional banking and finance 
 
Characteristics Conventional Banking Islamic Banking 
Constraints on finance model None  Prohibits Riba (usury), Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and Maysir (speculations). 
Its theoretical model encourages the sharing of profits, losses, and risks in 
investment activities. 
Prohibited activities None Prohibits investment in businesses whose products or activities are contrary to 
Islamic principles  
(e.g. pork, alcohol, pornography, tobacco, weapons, of mass destruction, gambling, 
cloning, and dangerous drugs). 
Types of depositors Traditional depositors receive fixed returns (interest) Depositors are contracted as investment account holders (IAHs) who share in 
profits, losses, and risks of the investments related to their deposits with the bank  
Business model and investment 
modes 
A risk-transfer model that is based on loans and interest-
bearing activities 
Encourages equity based financing instruments that are based on profit-loss sharing 
contracts [such as Musharakah (partnership / joint venture), and Mudarabah 
(partnership-based trust financing).  There are other contracts that are allowed such 
as Ijarah (lease) as well as Murabahah (cost plus profit sale)]. 
Corporate governance Conventional board of directors  
(One layer of governance mechanisms) 
Conventional board of directors and Shariah supervisory board  
(Two layers of governance mechanisms) 
Accountability constraints Legal accountability constraints Legal and moral accountability constraints 
 
  
37 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of full sample  
  Full sample  Islamic banks  Conventional banks 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SPOS 600 0.287 0.452 0 1 147 0.264 0.441 0 1 453 0.356 0.480 0 1 
EM 172 0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.007 37 0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.007 135 0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.006 
DACC 581 -0.039 0.145 -2.144 0.449 142 -0.039 0.137 -2.144 0.183 439 -0.041 0.167 -1.121 0.449 
EBT 598 0.017 0.014 -0.062 0.101 144 0.014 0.022 -0.059 0.101 454 0.018 0.010 -0.062 0.058 
GOV_OWN 597 0.231 0.237 0 0.948 143 0.170 0.161 0 0.651 454 0.250 0.254 0 0.948 
FOR_OWN 597 0.221 0.277 0 0.985 143 0.173 0.259 0 0.852 454 0.236 0.281 0 0.985 
DUAL 598 0.195 0.397 0 1 144 0.159 0.367 0 1 454 0.207 0.405 0 1 
BODIND 597 0.677 0.167 0 0.980 143 0.640 0.161 0.285 0.800 454 0.689 0.168 0 0.980 
LLPs 590 0.011 0.121 -0.045 0.104 139 0.014 0.015 -0.032 0.104 451 0.010 0.011 -0.045 0.097 
ΔNPL 528 0.008 0.061 -0.457 1.097 126 0.004 0.053 -0.457 0.112 402 0.009 0.064 -0.161 1.097 
NPL 550 0.079 0.116 0.005 0.935 134 0.077 0.115 0.005 0.671 416 0.079 0.116 0.032 0.935 
RET 592 -0.048 0.766 -12.19 2.74 147 -0.009 0.238 -1.00 -1.36 445 -0.062 0.872 -12.79 2.74 
LCO 501 0.006 0.013 -0.040 0.102 118 0.005 0.013 -0.040 0.098 383 0.006 0.013 -0.026 0.102 
LLA 527 0.055 0.081 0 0.716 130 0.046 0.077 0 0.526 397 0.060 0.082 0 0.716 
SIZE 600 15.80 1.198 11.990 18.620 146 15.695 1.201 11.99 18.13 454 15.838 1.196 12.870 18.620 
LEV 595 8.150 5.664 -62.640 58.090 143 6.825 4.128 0.010 19.63 452 8.569 6.012 -62.64 58.090 
CAP 555 2.729 0.423 1.260 5.210 137 2.997 0.496 1.910 5.210 418 2.641 0.355 1.260 3.590 
GRW 600 1.439 0.822 -0.064 6.532 146 1.420 1.041 0.001 6.533 454 1.446 0.740 -0.064 5.250 
CFO 594 0.305 4.571 -27.810 78.940 143 0.843 7.546 -0.581 78.940 451 0.135 3.073 -27.81 56.220 
AUDQ 600 0.896 0.304 0 1 146 0.976 0.163 0 1 454 0.872 0.334 0 1 
GCC 600 0.590 0.492 0 1 146 0.876 0.339 0 1 454 0.498 0.500 0 1 
TURC 600 0.190 0.392 0 1 146 0.041 0.199 0 1 454 0.237 0.426 0 1 
CORRUPT 600 58.259 20.449 10.520 92.344 146 57.270 20.410 10.800 90.440 454 58.163 20.511 10.526 92.344 
SPOS is a dummy encoded 1 if the ratio of net income to lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. EM is the difference between the discretionary part of 
realized security gains and losses and the discretionary part of loan loss provisions. DACC are the discretionary accruals measured based on Jones (1991) model as modified 
by Yasuda et al. (2004). EBT is earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. GOV_OWN is the percentage of shares held by government or government bodies. 
FOR_OWN is the percentage of shares held by foreign investors. DUAL is a dummy encoded 1 for CEO duality, 0 otherwise. BODIND is the ratio of independent members 
over the number of board members. LLPs is the ratio of loan loss provisions for year t to total loans in year t-1. ΔNPL is the change in nonperforming loans between year t and 
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t-1 deflated by total loans in year t-1. RET is the annual buy-and-hold stock return. NPL is the level of nonperforming loans deflated by total loans in year t-1.LCO is the loan charge-offs 
for year t deflated by total loans in year t-1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total common equity. CAP is the ratio of 
actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required regulatory capital. GRW is the ratio of market-to-book value of equity. AUDQ is a dummy encoded 1 if 
auditor is a Big Four, 0 otherwise. CFO is cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets. LLA is the ratio of loan loss allowances at the end of year t to 
total loans. GCC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, 0 otherwise. TURC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is 
based in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, 0 otherwise. CORRUPT is the control of corruption, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all 
countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to the lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank. 
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Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients among sample variables 
Panel A. Variables used on earnings management models 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.SPOS 1                  
2.EM -0.04 1                 
3.DACC -0.12 -0.03 1                
4.EBT -0.28 -0.08 -0.23 1               
5.IBs -0.15 -0.08 -0.01 0.001 1              
6.GOV_OWN -0.05 0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.14 1             
7.FOR_OWN 0.02 -0.28 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 1            
8.DUAL 0.01 -0.27 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.04 1           
9.BODIND -0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.10 -0.12 0.24 0.04 -0.18 1          
10.SIZE -0.17 0.44 -0.17 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.07 1         
11.LEV 0.15 -0.19 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 0.16 0.09 -0.11 0.13 1        
12.CAP -0.04 -0.17 -0.03 0.22 0.37 0.15 -0.06 -0.15 0.09 -0.27 -0.64 1       
13.GRW -0.08 0.13 -0.04 0.33 -0.01 -0.20 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.10 0.22 -0.08 1      
14.AUDQ -0.14 0.15 -0.05 0.13 0.14 -0.15 0.01 -0.11 -0.04 0.21 -0.09 0.24 0.15 1     
15.CFO -0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.02 1    
16.GCC -0.14 0.57 -0.09 0.12 0.33 0.10 -0.38 -0.33 0.09 0.38 -0.20 0.25 0.11 0.40 0.05 1   
17.TURC 0.08 -0.28 0.05 -0.11 -0.21 0.08 0.14 0.21 -0.10 -0.35 0.10 -0.26 -0.14 -0.59 -0.03 -0.58 1  
18.CORRUPT -0.04 -0.11 0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.03 -0.06 1 
Coefficients in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5% significance level or more. 
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Panel B. Variables used on the conditional conservatism model 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1.LLPs 1                     
2.ΔNPLt-1 0.02 1                    
3.ΔNPLt 0.04 -0.09 1                   
4.ΔNPLt+1 -0.16 0.27 -0.09 1                  
5.LCO 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 1                 
6.LCOt+1 0.15 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.46 1                
7.IBs 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 1               
8.GOV_OWN 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.14 1              
9.FOR_OWN -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 1             
10.DUAL -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.04 1            
11.BODIND -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 -0.14 -0.04 -0.12 0.24 0.03 -0.18 1           
12.SIZE -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.07 1          
13.LEV -0.22 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.16 0.09 -0.11 0.13 1         
14.CAP -0.02 -0.10 -0.17 -0.14 -0.02 -0.06 0.36 0.16 -0.06 -0.15 0.08 -0.27 -0.54 1        
15.GRW -0.21 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.10 0.22 -0.08 1       
16.AUDQ -0.13 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.15 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 0.21 -0.09 0.24 0.15 1      
17.CFO 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.00 1     
18.LLA 0.27 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.17 -0.06 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.05 -0.30 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.39 -0.02 1    
19.GCC 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.33 0.10 -0.38 -0.33 0.09 0.39 -0.20 0.25 0.11 -0.40 0.05 -0.30 1   
20.TURC 0.15 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.21 0.08 0.14 0.21 -0.10 -0.35 0.10 -0.26 -0.14 -0.49 -0.03 0.49 -0.58 1  
21.CORRUPT -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.06 1 
Coefficients in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5% significance level or more. 
SPOS is a dummy encoded 1 if the ratio of net income to lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. EM is the difference between the discretionary part of 
realized security gains and losses and the discretionary part of loan loss provisions. DACC are the discretionary accruals measured based on Jones (1991) model as modified 
by Yasuda et al. (2004). EBT is earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. GOV_OWN is the percentage of shares held by government or government bodies. 
FOR_OWN is the percentage of shares held by foreign investors. DUAL is a dummy encoded 1 for CEO duality, 0 otherwise. BODIND is the ratio of independent members 
over the number of board members. LLPs is the ratio of loan loss provisions for year t to total loans in year t-1. ΔNPL is the change in nonperforming loans between year t and 
t-1 deflated by total loans in year t-1 for the current previous and future period. LCO is the loan charge-offs for year t deflated by total loans in year t-1 for the current and 
future period. IBs is a dummy encoded 1 if the bank is classified as Islamic, 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to 
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total common equity. CAP is the ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required regulatory capital. GRW is the ratio of market-to-book value of 
equity. AUDQ is a dummy encoded 1 if auditor is a Big Four, 0 otherwise. CFO is cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets. LLA is the ratio of loan 
loss allowances at the end of year t to total loans. GCC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, 0 otherwise. TURC 
is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, 0 otherwise. CORRUPT is the control of corruption, which captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Percentile rank 
indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to the lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank. 
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Table 4. Conditional conservatism in Islamic banks and conventional banks 
 
Variables LLPs T-stat 
Constant 0.001 0.08 
ΔNPLt-1 -0.001 -0.16 
ΔNPLt 0.048** 2.56 
ΔNPLt+1 -0.028 -1.43 
LCOt 0.082* 1.79 
LCOt+1 0.110* 2.04 
IBs*ΔNPLt-1 0.041** 2.72 
IBs*ΔNPLt 0.003 0.11 
IBs*ΔNPLt+1 0.033** 3.69 
IBs*LCOt 0.075 0.78 
IBs*LCOt+1 0.018 1.17 
GOV_OWN 0.003 1.39 
IBs*GOV_OWN 0.006 1.15 
FOR_OWN -0.002 -0.84 
IBs*FOR_OWN 0.007 1.42 
DUAL -0.003 -1.21 
IBs*DUAL -0.005 -1.56 
BODIND -0.004 -1.38 
IBs*BODIND 0.004* 2.14 
SIZE 0.004 0.18 
LEV 0.001 0.35 
CAP -0.003 -0.16 
GRW 0.001* 1.82 
AUDQ 0.009* 2.34 
CFO 0.001 0.81 
LLA 0.023* 1.92 
GCC -0.002 -1.34 
TURC -0.003 -0.81 
CORRUPTION 0.003 0.21 
R2 24.68%  
F-stat 3.82**  
No. of observations 343  
Year fixed effects Included  
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
GOV_OWN is the percentage of shares held by government or government bodies. FOR_OWN is the percentage of 
shares held by foreign investors. DUAL is a dummy encoded 1 for CEO duality, 0 otherwise. BODIND is the ratio 
of independent members over the number of board members. LLPs is the ratio of loan loss provisions for year t to 
total loans in year t-1. ΔNPL is the change in nonperforming loans between year t and t-1 deflated by total loans in 
year t-1 for the current previous and future period. LCO is the loan charge-offs for year t deflated by total loans in 
year t-1 for the current and future period. IBs is a dummy encoded 1 if the bank is classified as Islamic, 0 otherwise. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total common equity. CAP is 
the ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required regulatory capital. GRW is the ratio of 
market-to-book value of equity. AUDQ is a dummy encoded 1 if auditor is a Big Four, 0 otherwise. CFO is cash 
flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets. LLA is the ratio of loan loss allowances at the end of 
year t to total loans. GCC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or 
Kuwait, 0 otherwise. TURC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, 0 otherwise. 
CORRUPT is the control of corruption, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, 
with 0 corresponding to the lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank. 
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Table 5. Regression results on earnings management in Islamic banks and conventional 
banks 
Variables SPOS  EM DACC 
Constant 7.062** 
(2.63) 
 0.003 
(0.97) 
0.411** 
(3.05) 
EBT 0.145** 
(7.17) 
 0.007 
(0.36) 
1.345* 
(1.82) 
IBs*EBT -0.885** 
(-3.55) 
 -0.049* 
(-1.79) 
-0.551** 
(-3.60) 
GOV_OWN -0.002* 
(-2.38) 
 0.003 
(0.63) 
-0.009* 
(-2.31) 
IBs*GOV_OWN 0.001 
(0.12) 
 0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(-1.53) 
FOR_OWN 0.002 
(0.48) 
 0.005* 
(1.84) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
IBs*FOR_OWN -0.003** 
(-2.93) 
 -0.046** 
(2.33) 
0.008 
(0.15) 
DUAL -0.251 
(-0.71) 
 0.009* 
(1.97) 
0.006 
(0.35) 
IBs*DUAL 0.506 
(0.67) 
 -0.003 
(-0.023) 
0.051 
(1.28) 
BODIND 0.292 
(0.39) 
 0.007* 
(1.78) 
0.009 
(0.25) 
IBs*BODIND -0.675 
(-0.73) 
 -0.003* 
(-2.10) 
0.037 
(0.76) 
SIZE -0.368** 
(-2.86) 
 0.002 
(1.39) 
-0.019** 
(-3.04) 
LEV 0.057 
(1.64) 
 0.001* 
(1.97) 
0.002 
(1.31) 
CAP 0.052 
(0.13) 
 0.002* 
(2.39) 
0.028 
(1.36) 
GRW -0.021 
(-0.14) 
 0.001 
(1.26) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
AUDQ 0.164 
(0.34) 
 -0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.010 
(-0.39) 
CFO -0.036 
(-1.01) 
 0.001 
(0.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
GCC -0.712* 
(-1.91) 
 0.002** 
(4.49) 
-0.009 
(-0.47) 
TURC -0.659 
(-1.51) 
 -0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.017 
(-0.76) 
CORRUPTION 0.014 
(0.18) 
 0.025 
(0.09) 
0.006 
(0.14) 
R2L 23.47% R
2-adj 55.05% 27.56% 
X2 149.63** F-stat 9.87** 2.32** 
No. of observations 545 No. of observations 164 530 
Year fixed effects Included Year fixed effects Included Included 
T-statistics are in the parentheses except for the SPOS model which presents z- statistics. **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed test). SPOS is a dummy encoded 1 if the 
ratio of net income to lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. EM is the difference between the 
discretionary part of realized security gains and losses and the discretionary part of loan loss provisions. DACC are 
the discretionary accruals measured based on Jones (1991) model as modified by Yasuda et al. (2004). EBT is 
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earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. GOV_OWN is the percentage of shares held by government or 
government bodies. FOR_OWN is the percentage of shares held by foreign investors. DUAL is a dummy encoded 
1 for CEO duality, 0 otherwise. BODIND is the ratio of independent members over the number of board members. 
IBs is a dummy encoded 1 if the bank is classified as Islamic, 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of year-end 
total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total common equity. CAP is the ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 
1 capital) to the minimum required regulatory capital. GRW is the ratio of market-to-book value of equity. AUDQ 
is a dummy encoded 1 if auditor is a Big Four, 0 otherwise. CFO is cash flow from operating activities deflated by 
average total assets. GCC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or 
Kuwait, 0 otherwise. TURC is a dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, 0 otherwise. 
CORRUPT is the control of corruption, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, 
with 0 corresponding to the lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank. 
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Table 6. Logistic regression result for audit selection 
Z-statistics are in the parentheses. **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). EBT is earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. GOV_OWN is the 
percentage of shares held by government or government bodies. FOR_OWN is the percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors. DUAL is a dummy encoded 1 for CEO duality, 0 otherwise. BODIND is the ratio of 
independent members over the number of board members. IBs is a dummy encoded 1 if the bank is classified as 
Islamic, 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total 
common equity. CAP is the ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required regulatory 
capital. GRW is the ratio of market-to-book value of equity. AUDQ is a dummy encoded 1 if auditor is a Big 
Four, 0 otherwise. CFO is cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets. GCC is a dummy 
encoded 1 if a bank is based in Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, 0 otherwise. TURC is a 
dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, 0 otherwise. 
  
Variables AUDQ 
Constant 5.780* 
(2.26) 
EBT 0.954* 
(7.09) 
IBs 0.109* 
(2.35) 
GOV_OWN -0.002 
(-0.55) 
FOR_OWN 0.009 
(-2.08*) 
DUAL 0.189 
(0.64) 
BODIND -0.129 
(-0.18) 
SIZE 0.327* 
(2.64) 
LEV -0.058 
(-1.55) 
CAP 0.103 
(0.27) 
GRW 0.045 
(0.32) 
CFO -0.033 
(-0.91) 
GCC 0.653* 
(1.93) 
TURC -0.539** 
(-1.45) 
R2L 19.05% 
X2 121.44** 
No. of observations 545 
Year fixed effects Included 
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APPENDIX A 
Distribution of listed banks by country and specialization 
Country No. of Banks Islamic Banks Commercial Banks 
Bahrain 8 5 3 
Egypt 10 1 9 
Jordan 11 2 9 
Kuwait 8 4 4 
Lebanon 5 0 5 
Morocco 6 0 6 
Oman 6 0 6 
Qatar 7 3 4 
Saudi Arabia 11 4 7 
Syria 8 0 8 
Tunisia 1 0 1 
UAE 19 5 14 
Total 100 24 76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
47 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definition 
LLPs Ratio of loan loss provisions for year t to total loans in year t-1 
ΔNPL Change in nonperforming loans between year t and t-1 deflated by 
total loans in year t-1 
LCO Loan charge-offs for year t deflated by total loans in year t-1 
IBs A dummy encoded 1 if the bank is classified as Islamic, 0 otherwise 
SPOS A dummy encoded 1 if the ratio of net income to lagged total assets 
is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise 
EM The difference between the discretionary part of realized security 
gains and losses and the discretionary part of loan loss provisions 
DACC Discretionary accruals measured based on the Jones (1991) model, 
as modified by Yasuda et al. (2004) 
EBT Earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets 
GOV_OWN The percentage of shares held by government or government bodies 
FOR_OWN The percentage of shares held by foreign investors 
DUAL A dummy encoded 1 for CEO duality, 0 otherwise 
BODIND The ratio of independent members over the number of board 
members 
SIZE Natural logarithm of year-end total assets 
LEV Ratio of total debt to total common equity 
CAP Ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum 
required regulatory capital 
GRW Ratio of market-to-book value of equity 
AUDQ A dummy encoded 1 if auditor is a Big Four, 0 otherwise 
CFO Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets 
LLA Ratio of loan loss allowances at the end of year t to total loans 
GCC A dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Oman, Qatar, UAE, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, 0 otherwise 
TURC A dummy encoded 1 if a bank is based in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, 
0 otherwise 
CORRUPT Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank 
among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 
corresponding to the lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank. 
 
